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I. Introduction and Background
• Motivation

III. CONCLUSION

II. Optimisation Algorithm
• Greedy Algorithms

Computer Networks are prone to targeted attacks and
natural disasters that could disrupt its normal operation
and services. To increase the resilience of a graph, links
can be added randomly to a graph. However, this
approach does not guarantee high improvement nor it
gives least cost. Optimally, adding links to form a full
mesh yields most resilient network. Practically, the
formation of full mesh is not feasible due to high cost.
In this research, we investigate the resilience
improvement of real-world networks via adding a costefficient set of links. We use a graph metric called flow
robustness as a measure for network resilience while
applying several targeted attacks on the non- and
optimised networks.
• Finding Optimal Solution Complexity
Given a graph G = (𝑉, 𝐸) where 𝑉 is the nodes set and
𝐸 is the links set. The number of complement links in
the graph is 𝐸 . Let 𝑇(𝐺) be the number of graph
instances that has the optimal solution.
Optimal solution with budget constraint
Examine all subsets of the 𝐸 :
𝑇(𝐺) = 2 𝐸

• Summary and Conclusion

We implement heuristic optimization algorithms based on a greedy approach. Given a graph, the
links are added one at a time to maximise the objective function and minimise the cost. The
objective functions are:
• maximizing the algebraic connectivity
• maximizing the total path diversity
• minimizing centrality variance
Network
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CORONET

75

99

2.64

17

9

6.45

0.16

1090

Internet2

57

65

2.28

14

8

6.69

0.15

630

Level 3

99

130

2.63

19

10

7.65

0.14

1628

Table1: graph properties of real-world physical networks used for evaluation

• Optimisation Cost
The cost is defined as the Euclidean distance between the two ends of the link. After adding each
link, we accumulated total cost of the added links as shown in Figure 1. Since we use the
algorithm to optimise physical level graphs, we add link length constraint to the selection of
candidate links because very long links that are not practical to be added to a physical graph. For
example, adding a physical fibre link between Los Angeles and Boston is unlikely to be feasible for
providers given the high cost incorporated by adding this link.

We investigate several optimization objective functions
based on the robustness metrics: maximizing the
algebraic connectivity, maximiing the total path
diversity, and minimizing centrality variance. We show
the cost incurred while adding links using each
objective function. For evaluation, we apply three
centrality-based attack on the non- and optimised
graphs. The results show the cost of using a(G)
optimization is higher than the other objective
functions. However, a(G) optimization yields the best
resilience in most cases for the studied physical graphs.
• Future Work
We plan to investigate more graph robustness metrics
and perform a comprehensive comparison among
them.
In this research, we assume data traffic between the
nodes is uniform. To have a more realistic model for a
given link, we will use the population of the two
connected cities to determine the flow through that
link.
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Figure 1: The cost incurred by adding links to physical graphs.

• Justin P. Rohrer, Abdul Jabbar, and James P. G. Sterbenz. “Path
diversication:A multipath resilience mechanism”. In Proceedings

of the IEEE 7th International Workshop on the Design of
Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN), Washington, DC,
October 2009.

• Opimasation Evolution
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removal, we measure the flow robustness value of the graph as shown in Figure 2.

• Centrality Metrics
The importance of the nodes can be inferred using
their centrality metrics such as betweenness,
closeness, and degree. Attacking nodes with high
centrality can disrupt the network normal operation.
Our objective is add links to lower the centrality
variance among the nodes , which in turn remove
the vulnerability via nodes with high centrality.
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Figure 2: Flow robustness yields from centrality attacks on non- and optimisaed Level 3 physical graph
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